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ABSTRACT
Time-to-Live data in the IP header offers two interesting
characteristics: First, different IP stacks pick different start
TTL values. Second, each traversed router should decre-
ment the TTL value. The combination of both offers host
and route fingerprinting options. We present the first work to
investigate Internet-wide TTL behavior at carrier scale and
evaluate its fit to detect anomalies, predominantly spoofed
source IP addresses. Using purpose-built software, we cap-
ture 2 weeks of raw TTL data at a 40 Gbit/s Internet up-
link. For further insight, we actively measure observed hosts
and conduct large-scale hitlist-based measurements, which
yields three complementary data sets for IPv4 and IPv6. A
majority (69% IPv4; 81% IPv6) of passively observed multi-
packet hosts exhibit one stable TTL value.
Active measurements on unstable hosts yield a stable an-
chor TTL value for more than 85% of responsive hosts. We
develop a structure to further classify unstable hosts taking,
for example, temporal stability into account. Correlation of
TTL values with BGP data is clear, yet unpredictive.
The results indicate that carrier-grade TTL anomaly de-
tection can yield significant insights in the following cate-
gories: First, the method can flag anomalies based on TTL
observations (yet likely at a difficult false positive/false neg-
ative trade-off). Second, the method can establish trust that
a packet originates from its acclaimed source.
1. INTRODUCTION
Attacks on Internet services and the underlying network
infrastructure are a constant threat. Attackers often conceal
their identity by using a forged source IP address. This con-
cept is called IP spoofing, and is associated with malevolent
intent. Spoofed IP addresses are frequently used in so-called
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
Using TTL characteristics for spoofing detection has been
suggested by Jin et al. in 2003 [14], however their design
and evaluation is based on traceroute measurements and syn-
thetic traffic. Even more recent work, such as by Mukaddam
et al. [18] in 2012 is based on small, IPv4-only, active data
sets and lacks evaluation against traffic from real users.
In this work, we establish ground work for a carrier-grade
traffic filter based on TTL characteristics to (a) detect IP
spoofing and (b) validate packets as likely not being spoofed.
We provide insight into Internet-wide TTL behavior by ana-
lyzing and correlating complementary data sets from passive
and active measurements on both IPv4 and IPv6. We assess
stability on host and subnet level and correlate Hop Counts
(the likely router path length) with BGP path lengths.
Our key contributions are:
• Carrier-grade passive TTL capturing and analysis for
IPv4 and IPv6 (Section 5)
• Dissection of TTL-unstable IP addresses into tractable
groups (Section 5.3)
• Correlation of Hop Counts with BGP data (Section 6)
• Correlation of passive data with both immediate and
bulk active measurements (Sections 7, 8)
• Sound data points for key design choices to build a
carrier-grade TTL filter (Sections 5, 7, 8)
• Publication of data and source code (Section 3.2)
The remainder of this paper, including highlighted findings,
is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related work,
and Section 3 describes our methodology, data sources, and
reproducibility of our research. Section 4 details the removal
of anomalies from our passive data set before evaluation. In
Section 5, we evaluate the refined passive data set in depth,
assessing TTL and Hop Count distributions and stability. We
define a multi-layered decision tree to group IP addresses
based on their various levels of TTL stability. These group-
ings and their corresponding sizes form an important data
base for designing a TTL-based anomaly filter. In Section 6,
we correlate our passively captured data set with BGP data.
We find a clear correlation between AS path length and Hop
Count of a subnet. However, this correlation is too noisy to
be used for prediction of a “correct” Hop Count for a given
subnet. In Section 7, we evaluate our pingback data set,
gained from sending ICMP Echo Request packets to all IP
addresses observed during our passive capture. These pack-
ets were sent within minutes of a passive observation and
typically offer a stable TTL value for an IP address. In Sec-
tion 8, we evaluate TTL characteristics for Internet-wide ac-
tive scans, which offer stable TTL values per IP address and
similar Hop Count characteristics (despite a different TTL
start value distribution). Section 9 discussed ethical consid-
erations undertaken by us, and Section 10 synthesizes results
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from the various data sets and presents promising paths for
future work.
1.1 Background on IP Spoofing and DDoS
IP spoofing is associated with malevolent intent and hides
an attacker’s IP address. Yaar et al. [29] associate IP spoof-
ing with two types of commonly observed DDoS attacks:
SYN Flooding: An attacker sends large quantities of
TCP SYN packets to an individual destination, typically from
spoofed source addresses. This forces the victim to keep
state for countless half-open TCP connections, often render-
ing the victim incapable of accepting genuine users.
We argue that a filter based on TTL values can typically de-
tect SYN flooding attacks: If a TTL value for the alleged
source address is known, the spoofed packet would typi-
cally fail to match it. Probabilities for attacker and victim
to share the same TTL value by chance are discussed in
Section 5.2. If no known TTL values for an IP address ex-
ist, we argue that (a) the amount of newly learned IP-TTL-
combinations will by far exceed normal thresholds, (b) the
TTL characteristics will behave differently than usual and
(c) predicted TTL values (e.g., from known IP addresses in
the same source network) will differ from those in spoofed
packets. We find one such attack in our data set and can
leverage TTL values to recognize it as a flooding attack.
Reflection Attacks: A reflection (or amplification) at-
tack abuses stateless protocols. These protocols are mostly
based on UDP and therefore require no handshake in order
to send data and trigger a response. The response can exceed
the request in size (amplification). Popular protocols which
are used for amplification attacks are DNS and NTP [6].
While the reflected attack traffic would easily be filterable
based on its simple characteristics (known source port and
few source IP addresses), its large volume typically drowns
the victim’s bandwidth. While TTL filtering at the victim’s
side does not seem promising (the TTL characteristics of ar-
riving traffic at the victim will seem genuine), deployment
at the amplifying network likely can catch this abuse based
on its TTL characteristics: If a TTL value is known for the
genuine source, the forged packets are unlikely to match it.
If no TTL value is known, we expect to be able to learn a
genuine value from active measurements. Also, if backscat-
ter from the victim is received, it will likely carry a different
TTL value than the forged request packets.
Carrier-Scale Mitigation Strategies: When detecting a
flooding attack towards a certain target IP address, the car-
rier could employ standard mitigation techniques (such as
dropping the first TCP SYN packet, which genuine users
will likely resend) for every source IP address observed with
an anomalous TTL. For reflection attacks, a staggered mit-
igation scheme could, depending on the level of certainty,
rate-limit or filter traffic for packets with TTLs considered
spoofed. Automatic or semi-automatic deployment of such
techniques at carrier level could reduce the attack surface for
DoS attacks.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss related work in the field of TTL
measurements as well as spoofing and DDoS protection.
Using TTLs for Spoofing Detection: The idea of lever-
aging inbound TTL values to detect suspicious and poten-
tially spoofed packets has been pursued by several groups.
In 2004, Jin et al. [14] proposed a solution to leverage hop
count filtering against spoofed DDoS traffic. Their data col-
lection and evaluation are based on traceroute measure-
ments to a limited number of targets and synthetic traffic,
which limits wider applicability. In 2007, the same authors
published follow-up work [25] based on the same data and
evaluation concept, but providing more ideas and details. In
2007, Gill et al. proposed RFC 5082 [12], which describes
a mechanism where TTL values are used to secure com-
munications between adjacent nodes such as peering BGP
routers: by setting an initial TTL of 255 and only accepting
packets with a TTL of 255 on the adjacent devices, packets
from outside the subnet are effectively discarded. In 2012,
Mukaddam and Elhajj [18] compared various IP attributes
based on active traces obtained from CAIDA’s Skitter project
[16]. They correlated hop count, country, Autonomous Sys-
tem and round-trip time of packets. They found a tendency
of IP addresses within the same AS to have similar Hop
Counts. They conclude that round-trip time is an effective
tool to distinguish IP addresses within the same AS. How-
ever, we are not aware of spoofing or DoS problems within
the same AS. We evaluated round-trip times for our mea-
surements, but found an even less predictive correlation then
for BGP data, and hence consider round-trip time as not use-
ful for large-scale TTL analysis. In 2015, Bo¨ttger et al. [4]
presented work to detect amplification attacks, suggesting
comparison of passively observed TTL values with active
measurements.
Our work significantly extends existing work by analyz-
ing Internet-wide active and passive data, a prerequisite to
evaluate carrier-grade feasibility.
Generic TTL Research: In 2006, Zander et al. [30] in-
vestigated a possible use of the TTL header for covert chan-
nels. They found flows to be very stable, and if TTLs are
changed, then typically only by ±1. In 2014, Huffaker et
al. [13] used a conjunction of TTL and Hop Count to as-
sess whether two given hosts are likely geographically co-
located.
IP Spoofing & DDoS Protection: Yaar et al. [29] pro-
pose StackPI, a traffic marking solution requiring coopera-
tion of upstream routers. A variety of such solutions has
been proposed, however they require wide-spread deploy-
ment and packet marking to work. BCP 38 (RFC 2827) [10]
proposes restricting downstream networks to the allocated
source addresses. Wide-spread deployment of BCP 38 would
effectively hinder IP spoofing, however since its proposal
in 2000, IP spoofing attacks continue to be common oc-
currences. Moore et al. [17] propose different flow metrics
(but not TTLs) to distinguish DDoS attack traffic (including
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spoofed packets) from normal traffic. Wang et al. [26] pro-
pose router-level SYN flood attack detection by monitoring
TCP connection establishment patterns, e.g., abundance of
SYN-RST packets. In 2015, Ryba et al. [24] published a
survey about amplification attack types and possible detec-
tion and mitigation strategies.
3. METHODOLOGY & DATA SOURCES
This section describes the approach and methodology ap-
plied to understand the nature of real-life TTL distributions.
Our setup consists of three components:
Passive Capturing: A passive capturing machine extracts
data from packets sent into the Munich Scientific Network
(MWN), which connects roughly 100,000 researchers and
students to the Internet through a 40 Gbit/s link. Using In-
tel X520-T2 cards, DPDK [1] and MoonGen [9], we effi-
ciently extract and store the tuple of <external IP address,
protocol, external Port, internal Port, TTL, timestamp> for
observed incoming packets. Hardware requirements are rel-
atively moderate, requiring 4 cores at 2.6 GHz and≈5 GB of
RAM. 2 weeks required ≈11 TB of storage.
Active Measurements: We conduct active measurements
based on “pingback” and “hitlist” methodologies:
pingback: An active measurement machine receives tar-
get IP addresses from the passive capturing machine within a
few minutes after an observation and conducts ICMP echo
request measurements to observed IP addresses, exclud-
ing blacklisted, not routable, not assigned, and IANA special
ranges. To limit third-party impact, we scan every IP address
only once in every 6 hours. We use an IPv6-extended ver-
sion of zmap [8] from [11]. Figure 1 depicts the pingback
measurement setup.
Internet
Passive monitoring
MWN
Pingback measurements
Periodic TTL 
data export
Figure 1: Measurement setup: Passive monitor observes packets from In-
ternet, triggers pingback from active measurement machine.
hitlist: In addition to measurements on passive observa-
tions, we conduct ICMP echo request measurements
on the entire IPv4 address space (also here excluding our
blacklist, not routable, bogon and IANA special ranges) and
towards an IPv6 hitlist according to Gasser et al. [11]. We
use ICMP echo request scans according to insights of
Gasser et al. [11].
BGP Capturing: A route server frequently stores BGP
data to allow analysis for routing changes and AS path length
comparison. This route server receives its updates from the
same source as the router at our observation point.
3.1 Transformation of TTL to Hop Count
Throughout this paper, we coin TTL as the raw value ob-
served in the IP header field according to RFC 791 (IPv4,
“Time to Live”) [23] and RFC 2460 (IPv6, “Hop Limit”) [7].
These fields are 8-bit integers, with a possibly range from 0
to 255. For insight into the network path between source
and target, it is of interest to estimate the Hop Count, i.e.,
the number of hops traversed. For estimating this, observed
TTL values are mapped back to starting values such as 32,
64, 128 or 255. A frequently cited study by Paxson [21]
states that most (but not all) routes in the Internet (in 1997)
had less than 30 hops, but also concludes that the Internet’s
core has grown beyond 30 hops and hence initial TTL val-
ues larger than 30 should be used. This is confirmed by our
data: 1.28% of IPv4 addresses and 0.01% of IPv6 addresses
exhibit TTL values outside the range of less than 32 hops
below common start values. Hence, transformation of TTLs
to Hop Counts can be faulty and we therefore synonymously
use the term Estimated Hop Count.
3.2 Reproducibility
We encourage other researchers to validate, reproduce and
advance our research using our data. All figures and tables
and certain numbers in the text in this paper are linked to
a website containing respective raw data and source code
to create the data representation. You can click the objects
directly or browse the list on our website [2].
4. PREPARATION OF PASSIVE DATA SET
This section outlines details of capturing and pre-process-
ing the passive data set. The capture period extends from
February 3, 2016 through February 16, 2016. The raw dataset
holds a total of 497 billion IPv4 and 37 billion IPv6 packets
(≈11 TB). These packets are spread across a total of 256
million IPv4 and 2.1 million IPv6 IP addresses.
4.1 Aggregation into Time Bins
To allow for efficient processing of our passive data set,
we create a version that aggregates data into 10 minute bins.
Each bin contains the observed IP addresses and their re-
spective TTLs. At a fraction of the raw data size, this data
format allows for faster evaluation where this level of detail
is adequate.
4.2 Traffic Statistics and Anomalies
Our first analysis aims to identify anomalies in the data
set that could distort further analysis.
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Figure 2: Passive Data Set: Time plot of packet arrival rate shows nocturnal
pattern, ECDF disproves spikes to be of significance.
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∆ 67.1% (172M) IPs 
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(0.9M IPs)
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Figure 3: Passive Data Set: IP address accumulation shows two major step-
changes of >40% each.
Packet arrival rate (see Figure 2) shows a nocturnal pat-
tern, with 3AM load at≈20% of 3PM load, and some small,
but insignificant peaks. Peaks were ≈751,000 packets per
second for IPv4 and ≈87,000 pps. for IPv6.
IP address accumulation quickly reveals major peaks for
IPv4 and IPv6 (cf. Figure 3): in very short time intervals
(<1h), the number of newly learned IP addresses sums up
to more than 40% of all learned IP addresses. Remarkably,
these peaks do not go along with significant peaks in packet
arrival rate.
IPv4 anomaly: 160M out of the 172M IP addresses in the
IPv4 anomaly are observed only during the anomaly and
only with 1 packet. A further breakdown reveals that 99.9%
of the 160M IP addresses sent packets towards port tcp80
within the MWN (the internal destination IP was not cap-
tured for privacy reasons). Further analysis of these packets
shows unusual TTL characteristics: 99.95% of packets ar-
rive with one of five distinct TTL values. Figure 4 shows
packet arrival rates for these TTLs during the anomaly.
Geolocation of IP addresses per TTL value (using the ip2-
location February country-level database [3]) maps IP ad-
dresses for every distinct TTL to at least 240 different coun-
tries. As it is highly unlikely for IP addresses from 240 or
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Figure 4: Packet rates during IPv4 anomaly.
more countries to arrive at our router with exactly the same
TTL value, we classify this anomaly as an TCP flooding at-
tack with spoofed source addresses. The five distinct TTLs
speak for 5 different hosts carrying out a distributed attack.
This underlines how flooding attacks can be recognized by
their anomalous distribution of TTL values. A sophisticated
attacker could try to imitate a more normal TTL distribution.
With a peak of ≈464,000 packets per second and a mini-
mum TCP packet size of 64 bytes, the attack traffic peaks at
'240 Mbit/s. We exclude this anomaly from our data set by
removing the affected time bins.
IPv6 anomaly: We correlate the IPv6 anomaly with an
outgoing SSL scan. This anomaly amounts to≈41% of IPv6
addresses observed. While the return traffic from this scan
is very likely genuine and carries correct TTL values, we
decide to exclude this anomaly from our data set as it would
include a large bias of arbitrary actively scanned hosts into
our passive data set.
Section Summary: We analyze basic characteristics of
our passive data set and find two anomalies. Using TTL
characteristics, we can classify one as flooding attack. We
remove both anomalies and create the refined passive dataset,
which holds 85.9 million IPv4 addresses and 1.62 million
IPv6 addresses. At the time of measurement, those addresses
were diversely located in 240 countries (IPv4) and 143 coun-
tries (IPv6), with some centricity displayed by Germany be-
ing ranked third (IPv4) and first (IPv6).
5. REFINED PASSIVE DATA SET
In this section, we analyze the refined passive data set for
various TTL characteristics.
5.1 TTL and Hop Count Distribution
First, we investigate this data set for its raw TTL distribu-
tion and its Hop Count distribution.
TTL Distribution: Diversity in TTL values is required to
effectively distinguish between genuine and spoofed pack-
ets. If we were to observe only 2-3 TTL values, probability
for an attacker to randomly share the correct TTL value of a
4
victim would be very high. To investigate TTL diversity, we
first look at its raw distribution.
Figure 5 shows the ECDF of TTLs for IPv4 and IPv6,
and Table 1 shows the top 10 TTL values per for IPv4 and
IPv6. We display the distributions for two different ways
of counting: one based on IP addresses, where every IP can
contribute every distinct TTL value once, and one packet-
based, where every packet can contribute its TTL value once.
Both ways of counting show the same structural behavior;
however, in packet-based counting, the TTL start value of
64 gains a large share from 255. This confirms that 64 and
255 are generally common TTL start values, and that 32 and
128 are common start values for IPv4.
HC Distribution: We next convert the raw TTL values to
Estimated Hop Counts as discussed in Section 3.1. Figure
6 shows that the majority of paths exhibit Hop Counts that
indicate a path length below 16 hops (96% for IPv6, 74%
for IPv4). Only 0.01% (IPv6) and 1.34% (IPv4) have Hop
Counts larger than 32. This is important to keep in mind for
further analysis based on Hop Counts. Figure 6 also shows
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Figure 5: Raw TTL Distribution in Refined Passive Dataset. Bias towards
start value 64 when counting per packet, bias towards start value 255 when
counting per IP. Start value 128 is common for IPv4, but uncommon for
IPv6. Start value 32 is still relevant for IPv4, although already considered
too small by Paxson in 1997 [21].
Rank TTLv4 HC1 %IPv4 TTLv6 HC1 %IPv6
1 50 64−14 8.40% 249 255− 6 17.01%
2 117 128−11 5.05% 56 64− 8 16.56%
3 118 128−10 4.76% 58 64− 6 9.34%
4 114 128−14 4.64% 57 64− 7 8.19%
5 115 128−13 4.29% 250 255− 5 7.91%
6 116 128−12 4.28% 59 64− 5 5.01%
7 51 64−13 3.53% 55 64− 9 4.96%
8 39 64−25 3.13% 248 255− 7 4.18%
9 119 128− 9 3.10% 61 64− 3 3.85%
10 49 64−15 3.09% 247 255− 8 3.15%
Sum Top 10: 44.27% 80.16%
1: Displayed as estimated start value minus estimated Hop Count.
Table 1: Top 10 TTL values in Refined Passive Data Set, count by IP ad-
dress: IPv6 offers less TTL spread and shorter Hop Counts.
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Figure 6: Hop Count distribution for Refined Passive Data Set. IPv6 paths
are shorter than IPv4 paths, a small number of paths is longer than 32 hops.
TTL Hop Count
n IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6
0 2.95% 9.01% 6.59% 14.60%
1 8.05% 21.08% 18.60% 36.29%
2 12.46% 29.60% 29.51% 54.74%
Table 2: Pcollision for TTL and Hop Count. n indicates the ± value a
filter would accept. Even a ±1 acceptance configuration would quickly
create a large false positive acceptance range.
that the vast majority of IPv6 paths is shorter than IPv4 paths
(under the assumption that IPv6 devices do not pick, for ex-
ample, a start value of 68 instead of 64). We find the Hop
Count distribution to be structurally in line with the find-
ings of Huffaker et al. [13, Figure 1] for IPv4 routers. How-
ever, comparison of raw TTL values shows a bias towards
a start value of 255 in this data set, suggesting that routers
frequently choose 255 as a start value.
5.2 Collision Probability
This section aims to assess the probability of two random
IP addresses (e.g., victim and attacker) to share the same
TTL or Hop Count value by chance. This would be called
a collision. Using the empirical TTL and HC distributions,
we now the estimate the collision probability Pcollision. We
save the empirical probability for a new packet to carry a
certain TTL or HC value in an array p[TTL/HC]. Equation
1 then estimates the chance for two random hosts to share
exactly the same or two n-adjacent TTL/HC values.
Pcollision =
255∑
i=0
p[i]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Same TTL/HC
+
255∑
i=n
p[i] · p[i− n] +
255−n∑
i=0
p[i] · p[i+ n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
±n TTL/HC
(1)
Table 2 shows Pcollision for both TTL and HC mode, based
on IPv4 and IPv6 empirical distributions.
The probability of a collision climbs to 34.67% in case of
IPv6 and HC±2 operation, indicating that a too loose filter
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Figure 7: Packets per IP address in Refined Passive Dataset. IPv6 addresses
have more packets, and one third of IPv4 addresses have only 1 packet.
would quickly falsely permit high ratios of spoofed packets.
Please also note the generally higher collision probability for
IPv6 due to its centricity towards fewer raw TTL and Hop
Count values.
Having gained understanding of time-static TTL and Hop
Count distributions and collision probabilities, we now in-
vestigate longitudinal TTL and Hop Count stability per IP.
5.3 TTL Stability
This section aims to understand the stability of TTLs ob-
served in our refined passive data set, i.e., whether an IP
address repeatedly appears with the same or different TTL
values. To properly understand TTL stability per IP address,
we first need to gain understanding about two potentially in-
fluencing factors: the number of packets per IP address and
the observation duration per IP address.
Number of packets: The number of packets can influ-
ence the validity of TTL stability for IP addresses in two
ways. For one, addresses with very few packets could ex-
hibit a more stable TTL behavior than addresses observed
with many packets. In the extreme case, IP addresses ob-
served with only one packet will obviously always be TTL-
stable. Figure 7 shows the ECCDF of number of packets
observed per IP: 2% of IPv6 addresses and 33% of IPv4
addresses are observed with only one incoming packet and
hence do not allow for TTL stability assessment. IPv6 ad-
dresses were typically active with more packets than IPv4
addresses. While most IP addresses originated 1000 or less
packets, some addresses have sent 10 billion packets or more.
However, the number of packets alone can not distinguish
two very different cases: An equal number of packets could
either be allocated to a single burst or be spread out equally
over weeks. The latter case is more prone to TTL instability
from topology changes. We hence investigate the duration
of IP address observations before judging TTL stability.
Duration: We measure duration with two metrics: The
first, observation duration, calculates the time difference be-
tween the last and the first observation of an IP address. The
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Figure 8: Activity Duration of IP addresses in Refined Passive Data Set:
IPv4 addresses with longer duration and more active bins for IPv6. Both
metrics show large portions of addresses with very short duration.
IP duration %IPv4 %IPv6
≤ 10min 50.1% 59.3%
≤ 1h 59.0% 73.3%
≤ 24h 74.4% 88.8%
> 24h 25.6% 11.2%
Table 3: Selected Duration of IP address activity for Refined Passive Data
Set: Tendency towards short activity, but fat tail of long-lived addresses.
second counts the number of 10-minute bins that an IP ad-
dress has been observed in: this metric is easy to calculate
from our binned format described in Section 4.2, and insight-
ful when used to rate sustained activity of an IP.
Figure 8 shows both these metrics as an ECCDF. We see
that both duration and count of active bins show a tendency
towards short observations, with more than 50% of IP ad-
dresses occurring in only one 10-minute interval. As we
cut duration at observation start and end, our metrics po-
tentially underestimate duration for some flows extending
through these data points. Also, some of the IP addresses
being observed for 13 or 14 days likely will be observable
as virtually always active, such as root DNS servers. Table 3
quantifies the share of IP addresses for selected durations.
A All IPs
B1 Single-packet
B2 Multi-packet
C1 Single-TTL
C2 Multi-TTL
D1 Single-Bin
D2 Multi-bin
E1 section-stable
E2 overlapping
Figure 9: Structure to evaluate TTL stability aims towards fanning out un-
remarkable characteristics (such as single-packet IP addresses) early.
Stability Evaluation: Having analyzed the distribution
of packet counts and observation durations, we now take a
closer look at TTL stability. To cope with the high dimen-
sionality of potential metrics and the high number of entries,
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Category IPv4# IPv4% IPv6# IPv6% cf.
A All 85,986,816 1,625,795
B1 Single-packet IPs 28,986,129 33.71% 37,354 2.30% F7
B2 IPs >1 packet 57,000,686 100.00% 1,588,441 100.00% F7
C1 IPs with 1TTL 39,431,567 69.18% 1,280,999 80.65% F10
C2 IPs >1TTL 17,569,119 30.82% 307,442 19.35% F10
D1 IPs with 1 active bin 1,467,531 2.57% 118,933 7.49% F8
IPs with 1 HC 48,950 0.09% 35,996 2.27%
IPs with >1 HC 1,418,581 2.49% 82,937 5.22%
D2 IPs with >1 active bin 16,101,588 28.25% 188,509 11.87% F8
E1 section-stable TTLs 12,923,493 22.67% 89,148 5.61%
IPs with 1 HC 1,791,556 3.14% 33,517 2.11%
IPs with >1 HC 11,131,937 19.53% 55,631 3.50%
E2 Overlapping TTLs 3,178,095 5.58% 99,361 6.26%
IPs with 1 HC 83,459 0.15% 27,137 1.71%
IPs with >1 HC 3,094,636 5.43% 72,224 4.55%
Table 4: Refined Passive Data Set. Quantitative data for TTL characteris-
tics based on decision tree: Behavior for IPv4 and IPv6 sometimes strongly
differs. Figures for certain data referenced in “cf.” column.
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Figure 10: Number of different TTLs and HCs per IP for Refined Passive
Data Set: Less Hop Counts per IP, IPv6 with generally less spread. Legend
gives % for 1 and 2 different TTLs/HC as well as maximum value observed.
we devise a structured decision tree, aiming to quickly cat-
egorize unremarkable behavior at an early stage. This early
categorization allows for more in-depth analysis of conspic-
uous addresses at a later stage. Figure 9 depicts the structure
of this staggered approach, Table 4 quantifies the size of the
respective groups.
B1 - Single-packet IP addresses: These do not allow for
resilient study of TTL characteristics and are hence filtered
out. It is remarkable that for IPv4, a very high number of
IP addresses (33.71%, ≈29M) occurred with only 1 packet,
compared to only 2.3% (≈37K) of IPv6 addresses.
C - Simple TTL stability: We next look at stability of TTL
and Hop Counts per IP. At this stage, we can already green-
light IP addresses observed with only 1 TTL (C1). This
includes 80.6% (IPv6) respective 69.2% (IPv4) of IP ad-
dresses. Figure 10 shows the ECDF of TTLs and Hop Counts
per IP. For IPv4 and IPv6, we find fewer different Hop Count
values than TTL values. IPv6 shows higher stability for both
TTL and Hop Count metrics.
D - Count of Bins: For IP addresses with several observed
TTLs, we next dissect “overlapping” (several active TTLs at
the same time) and “section-stable” (only one active TTL at
one point in time) IP addresses. We first filter out all IP ad-
dresses that were active in only one 10-minute bin (cf. Fig-
ure 8), as these do not allow for longitudinal analysis.
E - Section Stability: IP addresses active in several bins
(D2) are considered section-stable if no consecutive mixbins
(bins with more than 1 TTL per IP) exist. This allows 1
mixbin for transitioning between TTLs. Hypothesis for the
set of section-stable IP addresses E1 is that these are, for
example, dynamically assigned IP addresses at an ISP or le-
gitimate TTL changes due to routing changes. IP addresses
considered non section-stable (i.e., overlapping) are grouped
in E2. Interestingly, section-stable IP addresses clearly dom-
inate (≈78%) multi-TTL, multi-bin IPv4 addresses, while
having only a 50% share at IPv6 addresses. We hence argue
that dynamic reassignment of IP addresses to different end
hosts is much more common in IPv4 than in IPv6, a likely
behavior given IPv4 address scarcity.
To conclude, a simple approach can easily legitimate the
TTL behavior of 69% (IPv4) and 81% (IPv6) of addresses.
While it is difficult to classify the remainder as “normal”
or “not normal”, we succeeded in structuring it into several
clearly distinguishable groups that allow further investiga-
tion based on underlying root causes for their behavior.
5.4 Hop Count Stability
To further understand the cases of multi-TTL IP addresses,
we conduct analysis on estimated Hop Count values. Cer-
tain network characteristics, such as dynamic IP assignments
or DNS-resolving NAT routers, might be verified or falsi-
fied by Hop Count characteristics. We hence investigate the
Hop Count amplitude (HCA), defined as the maximum Hop
Count minus the minimum Hop Count per IP address, as
suggested by Zander et al. in 2006 [30].
Figure 11 displays ECDFs for various groups along our
decision tree and offers several clear conclusions: (a) IPv6
HCA more quickly saturates than IPv4, (b) IP addresses with
“overlapping” TTL behavior show the worst HCA and (c)
filtering on a HC amplitude of 1 would yield 92% (IPv4)
and 98% (IPv6) legitimate rates. Concluding, HCA filtering
can increase the level of insight over raw TTL matching, but
also increases Pcollision (cf. Section 5.2).
5.5 TTL Amplitude
The insights into Hop Count amplitude from the previous
section raise the question on TTL amplitude across different
groups of IP addresses. Figure 12 displays the ECDF for
IPv4 and IPv6 TTL amplitude across the same groups of IP
addresses as the Hop Count amplitude analyses in the previ-
ous section. It yields very powerful insights: TTL changes
group either at several small values, likely caused by rout-
ing changes or NAT anomalies, or at one distinct very large
value, likely a change of start values. We argue that combin-
ing Hop Count amplitude and TTL amplitude values in case
of a TTL change can bring important insights: A high TTL
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Figure 11: Hop Count amplitudes (Max - Min) per IP for Refined Pas-
sive Data Set: Single-bin IP addresses with lower Hop Count amplitude,
likely due to less probability for major routing changes in 10minute-bin. IP
addresses with overlapping TTL behavior with biggest HC spread.
amplitude indicates a change in the start value (and hence
likely the connected device), while a low TTL amplitude in-
dicates a sole routing change. Both insights could potentially
improve a TTL filter by enriching its knowledge.
5.6 Flow-Level Analysis
Further insight could be gathered by analyzing flow-level
data. We are aware that this is a challenging undertaking
at carrier-grade traffic levels. However, it might (a) provide
exemplary insight in this study and (b) still be conducted at
carrier-grade, if only applied to a minority of flows. For pri-
vacy concerns, our data set does not contain IP addresses
in the carrier’s customer cone (cf. Section 9). Hence, we
are not working on flows as commonly defined by a 5-tuple,
but on 4-flows. Using the birthday problem, we estimate a
lower bound for collision probability. Using an upper bound
of 65,000 randomly chosen ephemeral ports per IP (an aver-
age could be estimated from [15, Table 1]), equation 2 gives
the collision probability for an external IP and n concurrent
internal users:
Pflowcollision = 1−
n!
(
65000
n
)
65000n
(2)
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(a) IPv4: Step changes from 0 to 10 (likely routing changes) and at
64 (likely change between main IPv4 start values of 64 and 128, cf.
Figure 5). ≈90% of single-bin IP addresses with small changes.
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(b) IPv6: Step changes from 0 to 10 (likely routing change) and
around 192 (likely change between main IPv6 start values of 255
and 64, cf. Figure 5). Single-bin IP addresses not different at IPv6.
Figure 12: Refined Passive Data Set: ECDF of TTL amplitude (max-min)
for IPv4 and IPv6 highlights two step changes: Very small values for, e.g.,
routing changes or NAT gateways and very large values, likely for start
value changes.
We calculate a collision risk of 7.3% for n=100 users access-
ing an external IP at the same time, and 99.95% for n=1000
users. As the observed network peaks at 100K users, we can
assume a large share of collisions in 4-flows.
In our experiment, we found >90% of multi-TTL IP ad-
dresses to exhibit at least one 4-flow with several TTL val-
ues. Closer analysis revealed diverse characteristics, e.g., (a)
outbound DNS, (b) outbound HTTPS to large sites or (c) in-
bound mail traffic. As this high share of routing changes
or multi-TTL load-balancing seems highly unlikely, we dis-
card further analysis of our 4-flows at this stage. We con-
clude that significant insight into the behavior of unstable
IP addresses at carrier-grade will have to be gained from 5-
flows. Future work should investigate anonymized, privacy-
preserving capture of 5-tuples to allow collision-free flow
tracking.
Section Summary: Concluding analysis of our refined
passive data set, we found a majority of IP addresses to
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Figure 13: Distribution of Mean of Hop Counts per announced prefix (Y-
Axis) over AS path length of announced prefix (X-Axis). IPv4 displayed
on left side, IPv6 on right. Path lengths with too few data points displayed
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Coefficient IPv4 IPv6
Slope 1.14 1.81
Intercept 7.74 2.18
R2 0.05 0.15
P value < 10−8 < 10−8
Table 5: Linear regression parameters for Mean of Hop Counts per an-
nounced prefix compared to AS path length of Prefix. Very low P value
indicates strong correlation, low R2 indicates low predictability.
be TTL-stable and even more to be Hop Count-stable. We
defined and analyzed several subgroups of unstable hosts,
likely linked to network phenomenons causing these charac-
teristics. This data stock should be of great help in designing
a TTL-based anomaly filter. We next correlate our refined
passive data set with BGP data.
6. BGP CORRELATION
We collected BGP data during the capture period, at a
router receiving the same updates as the router deciding on
routing on the link we observe. Using this data, we investi-
gate whether there is a correlation between Hop Count and
AS path length. We reduce the problem to a time-static prob-
lem by (a) taking a full RIB snapshot at the beginning of
our capture period and (b) averaging all TTL values per an-
nounced subnet in our refined passive data set.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of mean Hop Count per
announced prefix over the AS path length of the same prefix.
The violin plots combine a box plot (center line) and a kernel
density estimate (“violins”).
Visual inspection offers several insights: (a) Hop Count
seems to increase with increasing AS path length, (b) Hop
Count distribution has a high standard deviation, (c) IPv6
paths are on average shorter in Hop Count length and (d)
IPv6 AS path lengths show less diversity, with almost no
paths outside the 3 to 6 range. We calculate linear regression
coefficients for both IPv4 and IPv6 and find both to clearly
show the existence of a correlation (both p-values < 10−8).
Albeit, this correlation suffers from low prediction power
for IPv4 (R2 = 0.05) and IPv6 (R2 = 0.18). This is equiv-
alent to the large spread visually observed. We conclude
that AS path length and mean Hop Count per prefix corre-
late, but spread is too large to use this data for prediction
of likely Hop Count values from AS path length. We note
that these numbers potentially contain bias where routes are
asymmetric. Although we record the BGP routes for out-
going packets, inbound packets might have followed a dif-
ferent route. For future work, analysis of the time-dynamic
case might yield interesting insight into the correlations of
routing changes and Hop Count changes.
Section Summary: We find AS path length clearly cor-
relates with Hop Count, but is an unfit predictor due to the
large spread of Hop Count values.
7. EVALUATION OF PINGBACK SCANS
To better evaluate the TTL values which we capture us-
ing passive monitoring, we conducted regular active mea-
surements. These pingback measurements are performed
for each IP address that we observed in the passive moni-
toring setup. We probe each seen IP address with an ICMP
echo request sent by zmap less than five minutes after
the IP is observed. This low delay ensures that any influence
of changing Internet routes is kept minimal. To reduce the
load on very active IP addresses, we probe each IP address
only once every six hours. As we run measurements every
minute, we use the short default zmap timeout of 8 seconds.
This might miss some IP addresses with very long delays (cf.
Padmanabhan et al. [19]). Our pingback measurements still
yielded a rather high response rate of 46% (IPv4) and 42%
(IPv6) of queried IP addresses. Table 6 displays the basic
statistics about our pingback measurements.
IPv4 IPv6
IPs scanned 85.9M 1.6M
IPs replied 46.12% 41.17%
Table 6: Pingback Measurements offer a rather high response rate of 46%
(IPv4) and 42% (IPv6) of queried IP addresses.
The following subsections investigate TTL and Hop Count
distributions, assess TTL stability within one measurement
run and over the complete period, and compare TTL stability
of passive and pingback data.
7.1 IP-Level TTL/HC Distribution
We first compare raw TTL and Hop Count distributions
between the passive data set and the pingback data set. As
our pingback machine is located 3 hops behind our passive
observations, we add an offset of 3 to all raw pingback TTLs
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(no overflows occurred). Figure 14 shows the distribution
of TTLs: the pingback measurements exhibit a very high
share (>90%) of IP addresses with a TTL start value of 64,
which is different from the distribution of our passive data
set. Three hypotheses could explain this behavior: (1) a
structurally different subset of IP addresses replied to our
pingback measurements, (2) middle-boxes with a start value
of 64 replied to our ping requests or (3) IP stacks predomi-
nantly use 64 as a start value for ICMP, but not for TCP/UDP.
Figure 15 compares the Hop Count distribution from our
pingback measurement to that from our passive data. IPv4
active paths seem a bit shorter, which could be caused by
middle boxes replying to ICMP echo request packets.
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Figure 14: Pingback Raw TTL Distribution: ≈90% of IP addresses in
Pingback measurements with a TTL start value of 64, compared to 65%
(IPv4) and 40% (IPv6) in passive observations.
0 8 16 24 32
Hop Count Values (IPs)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
E
C
D
F 
P
r(
H
C
 
 X
)
IPv4 Pingback (IPs)
IPv4 Passive (IPs)
IPv6 Pingback (IPs)
IPv6 Passive (IPs)
Figure 15: Pingback Hop Count Distribution: Pingback measurements
with slightly shorter paths for IPv4, potentially caused by middle-boxes
replying to ICMP echo request packets.
7.2 Stability within Measurement Run
To further analyze this phenomenon we evaluate TTL sta-
bility within one measurement run (we ran measurements
every minute). This way we can identify IP addresses which
behave strangely by responding with multiple TTLs even
within a single minute, which are likely caused by load bal-
ancers or other middle boxes and less likely by routing changes.
Tables 7 and 8 show the number of distinct TTL values of
one IP within one measurement run. The vast majority (>99%)
have a single TTL within one measurement run. We find
0.84% of IPv4 addresses with more than one TTL value.
This is in contrast to IPv6 where only 0.09% exhibit mul-
tiple different TTLs. Generally, we can see that IPv6 shows
a much cleaner picture with regard to TTL pingback stabil-
ity. Some IPv4 addresses send more responses than the three
request packets that we sent. One specific IP even repeat-
edly sent us more than 100 responses for our three request
packets. This IP belongs to a Ukrainian ISP which seems to
operate a NAT pool. We assume that in this case the ICMP
echo request packet was distributed to all users behind
the NAT pool. We looked at rDNS names of the 20 IP ad-
dresses with >3 TTLs and found 13 dynamic (IP encoded),
1 name server, 1 measurement machine, 2 “gateways” and 3
IP addresses without rDNS names.
Distinct TTLs Occurrence Percentage
1 87,945,276 99.16%
2 729,866 0.82%
3 17,319 0.02%
4 10 0.00%
5 3 0.00%
6 4 0.00%
7 1 0.00%
8 1 0.00%
42 1 0.00%
103 1 0.00%
106 1 0.00%
107 2 0.00%
Table 7: Pingback: IPv4 addresses generally respond with 1 TTL within
one measurement run with some interesting exceptions. IP addresses scan-
ned multiple times were counted multiple times.
Distinct TTLs Occurrence Percentage
1 2,493,673 99.91%
2 2,329 0.09%
3 9 0.00%
Table 8: Pingback: IPv6 addresses generally respond with 1 TTL within
one measurement run.
7.3 Longitudinal IP Stability
We further evaluate the longitudinal TTL stability of IP
addresses. Therefore we define three mutually exclusive sta-
bility classes: (1) IP addresses which are stable over the
complete measurement period, (2) IP addresses which are
stable within measurement runs but exhibit TTL changes
over the 2-week experiment, and (3) IP addresses which are
already unstable within one measurement run.
Table 9 shows the distributions of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
in these three classes. We can see that over 96% of IP ad-
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Stability IPv4 IPv6
(1) Stable 96.13% 97.93%
(2) Unstable Bin-stable 2.92% 1.98%
(3) Bin-unstable 0.95% 0.09%
Table 9: Pingback: Longitudinal stability of IP addresses.
dresses are stable over the complete measurement period.
There is, however, a non-negligible portion of IP addresses
which has stable TTLs within measurement runs, but ex-
hibits differences in TTL values over the complete measure-
ment period. This behavior could stem from routing changes
or load balancers choosing different paths for new measure-
ments. These unstable but bin-stable IP addresses are more
prevalent in IPv4 than IPv6. Finally, bin-unstable IP ad-
dresses are ten times more frequent in IPv4 than IPv6. This
hints at a more frequent deployment of TTL-unstable load
balancers and more complex routing topologies in IPv4.
To conclude, most IP addresses are stable over the com-
plete measurement run, IPv4 has a greater percentage of un-
stable TTLs than IPv6, especially when measuring within a
short time span.
7.4 Stability compared to Passive Data
One critical question about our pingback measurements is
whether these can help to establish a known, stable TTL (or
Hop Count) value for an IP address that exhibits ambiguous
TTL (or Hop Count) values. To assess these questions, we
took the set of addresses observed with more than 1 TTL
(and hence, more than one packet) in our passive observa-
tions. For those IP addresses, we evaluated the pingback
results and classified them into stable, unstable or unrespon-
sive. Table 10 shows this classification:
First, a large number of addresses simply does not re-
ply to ICMP echo request packets. These values are
in line with expectations and might be improved by send-
ing in-protocol packets. Second, of the responsive packets,
a majority exhibits one single TTL value. This behavior is
very encouraging for the goal of building a TTL-based filter:
Pingbacks to unstable hosts are possible, and typically pro-
vide a stable TTL value. This behavior can be used to infer
validity of observed TTL values, for example, by using this
IPv4 IPv6
Multi-TTL IPs 17.6M 0.3M
Pingback: =1 TTL 42.59% 26.33%
Pingback: >1 TTL, bin-stable 6.00% 4.10%
Pingback: >1 TTL, bin-unstable 1.08% 0.14%
Pingback: no response 50.34% 69.42%
Table 10: Addresses responsive to pingback measurements typically
provide one single, stable TTL value. Only ≤1.1% of IP addresses bin-
unstable.
value as a lower bound for the expected Hop Count (under
the assumption that ICMP echo request packets would
be responded to directly by a load balancer).
Section Summary: In this section, we investigated TTL
and estimated Hop Count distribution for the pingback mea-
surements conducted. We found a strong bias towards a start
value of 64 in the start values, but a similar Hop Count distri-
bution. While over 50% of passively observed IP addresses
would not respond to pingback measurements, those who did
respond would typically provide a singular TTL value. Some
IP addresses replied with more packets than were sent.
8. EVALUATION OF HITLIST SCANS
We scan the routed IPv4 address space, excluding our
blacklist, and an IPv6 hitlist according to Section 3. Table 11
breaks down the number of packets sent and the various re-
ply types received. Our scanning host connects to the Inter-
net via the same uplinks which we monitored for the passive
data sets. However, it is 3 hops behind the monitored link.
We correct this offset in the active data set. We only evaluate
echo reply packets to not distort our data set with error
responses from routers. For those, we first evaluate raw TTL
distribution to gain insight into the TTL behavior of our ac-
tive ICMP probes compared to the passively observed traffic
(which is UDP/TCP).
Category IPv4 IPv6
Target IPs 2.744B 1.962M
Responsive IPs 14.20% 64.48%
Multi-TTL IPs1 1.07% 0.61%
Packets sent 8.232B 5.887M
Packets received 17.37% 67.46%
Echo reply2 87.91% 91.85%
Unreachable2 5.34% 4.43%
Redirect2 3.72% N/A
Time exceeded2 3.01% 1.63%
Other2,3 0.02% 2.09%
1: % of responsive IPs 2: % of received packets
3: Including, e.g., Prohibited or Reject Route.
Table 11: Hitlist Scans: Much higher response rate for IPv6 (as expected),
responsive IP addresses very rarely observed with > 1 TTL.
8.1 IP-Level TTL/HC Distribution
Figure 16 displays the raw TTL distribution of both scan-
ned IP addresses and passively observed IP addresses. Sim-
ilar to our pingback measurements (cf. Figure 14), a TTL
starting value of 64 is more common in our hitlist scans. This
effect is quite interesting and could be explained by receiv-
ing replies from different devices other than the actual end
hosts (such as a NAT gateway). However, converting the raw
TTL values to estimated Hop Counts (cf. Figure 17) shows
no significant difference between the active and passive data
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IPv4 IPv6
Rank Amplitude Frequency Amplitude Frequency
1 1 90.83% 1 79.28%
2 2 3.40% 5 9.80%
3 3 1.83% 2 8.71%
Multi-TTL IPs: 4,157,730 7,769
Table 12: Top 3 TTL amplitudes per IP for Multi-TTL IP addresses in
Active Scan indicate a typical low spread of TTL values for active scans.
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Figure 16: Raw TTL distribution of IP addresses: Active scans (solid lines)
with larger share of a 64 start value than passive observations (dashed lines).
0 8 16 24 32
Hop Count Values (IPs)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
E
C
D
F 
P
r[
H
C
 
 X
]
IPv4 (Active)
IPv4 (Passive)
IPv6 (Active)
IPv6 (Passive)
Figure 17: Hop Count distribution of IP addresses: IPv6 paths (dot-marked
lines) shorter, no significant difference between active and passive measure-
ments.
sets. This shows that while the raw TTL distribution for ac-
tive and passive measurements differ, the difference is solely
limited to different start values and does not affect the esti-
mated Hop Count. This also means that our passive data set
has no significant bias regarding the distance of the observed
hosts, which speaks for a representative passive sample.
8.2 Subnet Level TTL/HC Distribution
We next analyze TTL and estimated Hop Count distribu-
tion for various subnet sizes. Working on subnet aggregates
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Figure 18: Standard deviation of Hop Counts within IPv4 subnets: Smaller
subnets exhibit smaller standard deviations, 20% of /24 subnets with σ = 0.
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Figure 19: Amplitude (max-min) of Hop Counts within IPv4 subnets fea-
tures same structure as standard deviation (cf. Figure 18). Grouping into a
filter allowing a median ±1 would, e.g., work for 60% of /24 subnets.
instead of individual IP addresses could reduce memory us-
age in a filter and also give a-priori information about newly
observed IP addresses stemming from a known subnet. We
group the IP addresses observed in our active scans into eq-
uisized subnets to evaluate the feasibility of such an aggre-
gation. This approach only yields useful results for our full
IPv4 scan as the number of IPv6 hosts is very small com-
pared to even a /64 subnet size. Future work could leverage
a radix tree, suggested by Cho et al. [5] and recently applied
by Plonka and Berger [22] to IPv6, to dynamically group
IPv6 addresses into subnets of adaptive size.
Figure 18 shows the stability of active subnets (with at
least one active host) by plotting the standard deviation of
Hop Counts within subnets. A standard deviation of 0 means
that a subnet is completely stable – all reachable hosts in a
subnet had the same Hop Count. Note that this figure in-
cludes trivially stable subnets with only a single active host
or subnets with few hosts. It is still useful for the proposed
filter as aggregating subnets with few hosts is still valid and
useful. The data shows that even relatively large groupings
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such as /24 subnets are completely stable in 20% of the
cases, and /28 subnets are even stable in > 50% of cases.
Figure 19 plots the difference between the maximum and
minimum estimated Hop Count observed within a subnet:
For a /24 subnet, for example, ≈60% of subnets could be
grouped within a range of 3 Hop Counts (a median ±1). As
expected, amplitude increases with subnet size, posing an
optimization problem to find a suitable aggregation size.
The Hop Count spread can be caused by various reasons,
e.g., cascades of NAT devices or splitting up a /24 subnet
into layer of smaller subnets with hierarchical routing. In-
vestigating groups of addresses with equal Hop Counts with-
in a subnet could be an interesting course for future work.
Further, data from BGP can be incorporated to determine
subnet sizes. However, BGP data only represents an up-
per bound for the subnet size as the announced, often ag-
gregated prefix can be split into smaller subnets within the
AS. Subnet aggregation with permissive ranges will also in-
crease the chance for a random attacker to have a correct
Hop Count. For example, the previously discussed filter that
would group 60% of /24 subnets to a median ±1 would suf-
fer from a 18.6% chance for an attacker to randomly offer a
correct Hop Count (cf. Table 2). Having discussed the distri-
bution of TTL and Hop Count from our active hitlist scans,
we conclude that dynamically tracking and, where needed,
splitting, subnet sizes could be a feasible course of action
for a filter to reduce memory need and predict likely Hop
Counts for new IP addresses. However, adjusting for low
false positive and negative rates could be a challenging task.
Section Summary: In our hitlit scans, we find responsive
IP addresses to typically show stable TTL behavior. Un-
stable IP addresses typically have very low TTL amplitude.
Raw distribution is (as for pingback) biased towards a start
value of 64, while Hop Counts are similar. We aggregated
for different subnet sizes and show that, depending on subnet
size, significant shares of subnets show TTL-stable behavior.
This confirms potential use of a dynamic subnet aggrega-
tion/splitting.
9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section outlines ethical considerations undertaken re-
garding active and passive measurements and data release.
Our research group follows an internal multi-party approval
process before any measurement activities are carried out.
This approval process incorporates the proposal of Partridge
and Allman [20] to assess whether the collection of data can
induce harm on individuals and whether the collected data
reveals private information. We draw the following conclu-
sions from this process:
Active Measurements can be interpreted as an attack, re-
sulting in investigative effort for system administrators. To
minimize the intrusiveness of our active network measure-
ments we implement the following procedures:
First, we set up a website on the scanning machines which
explains our measurement activity in detail, combined with
descriptive rDNS names and a dedicated abuse address. Sec-
ond, we maintain a blacklist of hosts and networks which
will not be scanned in any of our measurements. Third, we
reply to every e-mail received on the abuse address. Through-
out this experiment, we were not contacted by affected users.
As we only send ICMP echo request probes at a low
rate, and use a 6-hour back-off per IP, we consider these
measurements of low interference, as underlined by the fact
that no users contacted us.
To conclude, we argue that no individual was harmed as a
result of our active measurements. To avoid revealing private
information, we take the following measures when releasing
data: scans towards a public hitlist can be released in full,
scans based on passive observations will be anonymized as
suggested by Xu et al. [28] before release.
Passive Measurements offer potential for intrusion into
user privacy. We protect privacy by only observing incom-
ing traffic, by not storing any payload data, and by only cap-
turing the external IP address of a communication. This pre-
vents reconstruction of communication partners and content.
10. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We deliver promising ground work on carrier-grade ano-
maly detection by using TTL values: We capture and ex-
haustively analyze the first of its kind carrier-grade TTL data
set, finding a majority of IP addresses to be TTL-stable.
For unstable IP addresses, we develop and quantify tracta-
ble subgroups and further analyze their TTL and Hop Count
behavior. We correlate our data set with BGP data and find
a clear, but unpredictive correlation. Comparison with ping-
back scans proves that these typically yield valuable insight
into determining an anchor Hop Count for multi-TTL IP ad-
dresses. Hitlist scans into the Internet confirm that our pas-
sive data carries largely unbiased Hop Count data. We find
variable portions of different subnet sizes to show uniform
Hop Count behavior. These insights will be of great value in
designing a state-of-the-art filter for carrier-grade TTL ano-
maly detection.
Future Work: We see potential for future work to (a) dis-
sect TTL stability along additional criteria, e.g. server/client
port, (b) quantify the impact of routing changes into TTL be-
havior, (c) further investigate and classify the network char-
acteristics leading to several observed TTL values per IP, and
(d) design an online TTL filter.
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